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The idea of an international criminal court was probably contemplated by 
dreamers in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, but it did not grow legs until 
the weeks following the armistice that ended the First World War. The forum for 
much of the debate was the Commission on Responsibilities, a body set up by the 
Preliminary Peace Conference in January 1919.1 At its second meeting, the 
Commission decided to establish three sub-commissions, each charged with 
developing recommendations on a piece of the problem. The first of them focused 
on fact-finding, while the other two addressed the legal issues. 2  One sub-
commission considered the responsibility for planning and launching the war, and 
the other examined violations of the laws and customs of war committed during 
the conflict.3 
 Thus, from the earliest days of international criminal justice, a distinction 
was made between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. Ultimately, the 
Commission on Responsibilities decided to focus criminal justice on the 
violations committed during the war rather than the responsibility for starting it.4 
But the important decisions on the content of the peace treaty were taken not by 
the Commission but by the Council of Four, which convened in April 1919. The 
Council set aside much of the Commission report. It agreed to create an 
international tribunal to try the German Emperor for “a supreme offence against 
international morality and the sanctity of treaties.”5 The trial never took place, of 
course, because the Netherlands refused to surrender the Kaiser. 
 When international justice revived during the Second World War in 
forums like the London International Assembly, the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission, and the London Conference, the debates about the relationship 
between responsibility for starting a war of aggression and crimes committed 
within the conflict resumed. The judges of the International Military Tribunal 
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addressed the issue by describing the category of crimes against peace as “the 
supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it 
contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”6 They presented a 
holistic view of international criminality for atrocities by which crimes against 
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity were joined in what amounted to 
a symbiosis. 
 That relationship was challenged, although only indirectly, during the 
1990s, when the Security Council established ad hoc tribunals to respond to the 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The statutes of those institutions 
were confined to the jus in bello.7 What the International Military Tribunal had 
called the “supreme international crime” was absent. This is partly explained by 
the understanding that the conflicts in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda were 
essentially non-international in nature.  But the uncertainty about the status of the 
“supreme international crime” persisted during the drafting of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC).8 Eventually, the vision of the International 
Military Tribunal began to be restored with the adoption, at Kampala, of 
amendments to the Rome Statute on the crime of aggression.9 These entered into 
force in 2013 and are expected to become fully operational at the end of 2017.10 
Yet a tendency to marginalize the crime of aggression persists. For example, a 
press release issued by the ICC in February 2017 described the Court as “the first 
permanent international criminal court established to help end impunity for the 
perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community, 
namely: genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.”11  Of course, not 
only does article 5 of the Rome Statute include the crime of aggression as one of 
the four core crimes, but the amendments adopted at Kampala entered into force 
nearly four years ago. The oversight is a bit symptomatic. 
 Benjamin Ferencz, who has probably thought about these issues longer 
than anyone else on the planet, manifests in his writings and lectures an 
understanding of the bonds that join the crimes of the jus ad bellum to those of the 
jus in bello. He has developed a very creative approach by which aggressive war 
is positioned under the umbrella of crimes against humanity.12 It makes a neat and 
persuasive complement to the vision at Nuremberg, whereby crimes against 
humanity were hitched, as it were, to war crimes and crimes against peace. In that 
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sense, it might be said that crimes against humanity have become the “supreme 
international crime.” 
 Challenges to the link between the crime of aggression and the other 
atrocity crimes are explained, at least in part, by an insistence upon the distinction 
between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello that comes from international 
humanitarian law. Without necessarily proclaiming total indifference on the 
lawfulness of the use of force, there is nevertheless an emphasis on conduct 
within the conflict and an affirmation of the essential equality of the parties, a 
consequence of ignoring the responsibility for the war itself. 
What is a useful distinction in international humanitarian law seems to have 
spilled over into the international law of human rights. For example, at the 
Kampala Review Conference a position paper published by Human Rights Watch 
explained that the organization did not have much interest in the amendments on 
the crime of aggression because its focus was on the jus in bello rather than the 
jus ad bellum. 13  Amnesty International did much the same, explaining that 
“peace” was not a part of its mandate, which was derived from the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, because that document does not deal with the 
lawfulness of the use of force.14 
This is a very narrow interpretation of the scope of international human rights. 
The opening words of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirm that 
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in 
the world.” 15  The concluding phrase confirms the relationship of three 
fundamental objectives.16 The sentence as a whole highlights the connection 
between freedom, justice, and peace and the protection of fundamental human 
rights. 
After a period of some legal uncertainty as to whether or not human rights law 
applies during armed conflict, some having argued that it is displaced by the lex 
specialis of the law of armed conflict, it is now beyond serious dispute that human 
rights protections and obligations continue during wartime. According to the 
International Court of Justice, “the protection offered by human rights 
conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of 
provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in article 4 of the International 
																																																								
13  HUMAN RTS. WATCH, MAKING KAMPALA COUNT: ADVANCING THE GLOBAL FIGHT 
AGAINST IMPUNITY AT THE ICC REVIEW CONFERENCE (May 10, 2010), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/05/10/making-kampala-count/advancing-global-fight-against-
impunity-icc-review-conference (“We have not participated actively in negotiations on the crime 
of aggression. We believe that we are most effective as a human rights organization if we do not 
opine on issues of jus ad bellum, the lawfulness of waging war, and instead adopt . . . an approach 
of strict neutrality during armed conflicts.”). 
14  AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CONCERNS AT THE 
SEVENTH SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES 23 (Oct. 2008). 
15 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights]. 
16 Id. 
2017 / Symposium 31 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”17 Article 4 permits no derogation to the 
right to life.18 Moreover, the European Convention on Human Rights permits 
derogation from the right to life only for “lawful acts of war.”19 The rather limited 
travaux préparatoires of the Convention suggest that this phrase may well apply 
to the jus ad bellum as well as to the jus in bello. 
It can be no more accurate to claim that the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights is inapplicable in wartime than to say that the Charter of the United 
Nations, from which the Declaration is derived, does not operate during armed 
conflict. The importance of the right to life, sometimes described as the “supreme 
right,” enshrined in article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in 
all of the major treaties of general application, is at its most acute during armed 
conflict.20 The right to life manifests itself in specific norms of the law of armed 
conflict, such as the prohibition of attacks on non-combatants and on civilian 
objects.21 
Article 29(2) of the Declaration recalls that “[i]n the exercise of his rights and 
freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by 
law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights 
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public 
order and the general welfare in a democratic society.”22 How can it be contended 
that the Universal Declaration is silent on the lawfulness of the use of force if the 
Declaration permits limitation of the right to life only when it is “determined by 
law”? Obviously, unlawful resort to force to settle an international dispute cannot 
be consistent with the requirement that it be “determined by law.” 
The law of armed conflict takes its distance when the lawfulness of the use of 
force is concerned. It examines whether deprivation of life is arbitrary only from 
the perspective of the jus in bello. There is no reason for international human 
rights law to take the same path. Killing in an unlawful war is unlawful killing. It 
may escape the sanction of the law of armed conflict because of the internal logic 
of that system. But that rationale should not and cannot apply to international 
human rights law, where it is fitting to speak of a human right to peace.23 The 
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criminalization of the unlawful use of force—the crime of aggression—is the 
corollary of this human right to peace. 
